The word ‘intertextuality’ was coined by Julia Kristeva in 1966. It is now often used by classicists to refer to the reference by a written text to one or more prior written texts, reference that, as such, confers some significance on the new text. For classicists, the word ‘intertextuality’ usually indicates an interpretive orientation, especially to Latin literature, that goes back to the essay, *L’Arte allusiva*, published by G. Pasquali in 1942. For non-classicists, the word refers primarily to a body of literary theory that emerged in various writings of Kristeva and others in the *Tel Quel* group. The main theoretical work was complete by about 1970 and is summed up in the dictionary published by O. Ducrot and Tzvetan Todorov in 1972. An enormous amount was written after 1972, especially in French and German.


2 R. Thomas, *Virgil’s Georgics and the Art of Reference*, HSCP 90, 1986, 171-98 at 174: «... two absolute criteria ... the model must be one with whom the poet is demonstrably familiar, and there must be a reason of some sort for the reference — that is, it must be susceptible of interpretation, or meaningful». Cf. G.B. Conte, *Latin Literature: A History*, Baltimore - London 1994, 812, where ‘intertextuality’ is defined as «Phenomenon by which, in literature, each new text enters into a network of relations with other, already written texts (recalling them, imitating them, parodying them, in short, presupposing them)».


4 For the intellectual history of the concept of intertextuality, the indication that Kristeva provides in *Pour une sémiolege des paragrammes* (1966), in Σπιμεωτης, 174-207 at 182 n. 11 is important: she credits Ph. Sollers with the origin of the set of ideas that make up what we call intertextuality. For a bibliography on the *Tel Quel* group, see H.-P. Mai, *Bypassing Intertextuality: Hermeneutics, Textual Practice, Hypertext*. in H.F. Plett, ed. *Intertextuality, Research in Text Theory*, XV, Berlin - New York 1991, 30-59 at 37.
building on the foundation laid in the 1960s. Classics, on the other hand, works with a concept of intertextuality that is still evolving. On the Greek side, it has been difficult to talk about intertextuality in archaic and fifth-century Greek literature.

We tend to think of that literature in terms of performance, whereas intertextuality seems to presuppose written texts. On the Latin side, the nature, function, and terminology of intertextuality continue to be controversial.

One can refer, then, to a classical philological or simply philological concept of intertextuality, and a post-structural one. These two have had little to do with each other.

Classicists have not been completely unaware of the theory of intertextuality that developed outside of Classics, but, for the most part, they have averted their eyes. The practice, in classical studies, has been research on individual authors and on particular examples. Post-structuralist discussion of intertextuality rarely takes examples from Greek and Latin, and rarely shows awareness of research by classicists.

One of the reasons for this mutual disregard is that the philologists and the post-structuralists have vastly different ideas about what a text is. A fortiori, their ideas about intertextuality will be different. A comparison between the philological and the post-structuralist concept of the text will be made later in this paper, and the question of the boundaries of intertextuality, the central question at the moment, will be raised. But I shall begin with a survey of intertextuality studies in Classics, and, for the sake of argument or exposition, I shall assume the definition of intertextuality given at the outset of this paper.

In that definition, writing was included. Greek literature, then, is not going to display intertextuality until well on in its history. There can be no intertextuality in the period of oral composition and performance, i.e. before any performance becomes a written text.

But oral poetic traditions were attaining enough fixity in the archaic period, in the mode of recomposition in performance, for one oral tradition, as distinguished from a text, to refer to another oral tradition\(^5\). Examples are the references by the *Odyssey* to the *Iliad*, or

by the funeral of Patroclus in the *Iliad* (Φ) to the funeral of Achilles in the *Little Iliad*. (There are those who say that such references are already intertextual, but here the matter is presented from an Parryist-oralist point of view).

Under the heading of references from one oral tradition to another, I would provisionally include apparent references in archaic lyric to Homer, the Epic Cycle, and Hesiod. M.G. Bonanno in a series of studies published in *L'allusione necessaria* has shown the subtlety and complexity of such references. There is the question, however, of specifically lyric, and also of specifically elegiac and iambic, traditions that had their own formulas resembling epic ones, cognate with epic ones, but not actually modelled thereupon. In the case of Pindar, of whom we have a considerable number of poems and are on firmer ground than in the case of archaic lyric, it has been argued that his references to poems of the Epic Cycle are actually not to individual poems but to an undifferentiated epic tradition; further, that the presence of heroic narrative in Pindar is an outgrowth of a tradition specific to Pindar’s own poetry. Analysis of the hexameter as a synthesis of dactyro-epitrite and of Aeolic metrical patterns even supports Pindar’s claim that epic is an outgrowth of his own kind of poetry. The two systems, dactyro-epitrite and Aeolic, are of course still differentiated and autonomous in Pindar. In sum, it is not

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6 The refusal of the Winds to blow has been shown to belong to the tradition of the funeral of Achilles, who had killed Memnon, the son of Aurora and the brother of the Winds: see J.T. Kakridis, *Homer Reúnces*, Lund 1949, 75-83.


8 Nagy, *Pindar’s*, 416-17, 437.
surprising therefore that it is difficult to find in Pindar references to
earlier poetry of a kind that could be called intertextual on, to repeat,
the definition with which I am working.

When names are attached to a poem or to a corpus of poems,
then one 'poet' can refer to another, as Solon does to Mimnermus,
Simonides to Homer, and so forth⁹. But this practice did not secure
any fixity of texts and probably does not presuppose written texts:
concurrently with this reference by name of poet, there is a migration
of lines from one corpus to another, without attestation, as we see
again and again in the Theognidea, or from one poem to another, as
in the case of a passage found in both the Odyssey and in Hesiod’s
Theogony¹⁰. This migration is not a function of writing, and we cannot
talk about intertextual references by one text to the other. In the case
of the intrusive passages in the Theognidea, they have very plausibly
been explained in terms of originally oral, sympotic reuse.

When writing comes into use, the first step to intertextuality is
immediately taken: a written text can refer to oral poetry and oral
poetry can refer, at least implicitly, to writing, if not to a particular
written text.

First, an example of the reference by a written text to oral poetry.
One of the earliest texts written in the Greek alphabet, an inscription
on a Late Geometric skyphos, begins with an allusion, in a line of
prose, to the cup of Nestor in the Iliad (A 632-37), and continues with
two hexameters parodying epic style¹¹. Thus it is an example of a
written text referring to poetry that was still mainly oral, even if, as
many believe, the Iliad and the Odyssey were already written down as
early as the time of the skyphos, i.e. the late eighth century, and even
if, as some believe, the Iliad and the Odyssey were composed with the
aid of writing. There would, I believe, be general agreement that,
neither for their composition nor for their recognition, do the poetic
allusions in the inscription on the skyphos presuppose the availability
of a written text of the Iliad¹². (The cup of Nestor returns in the

⁹ A. Ford, The Politics of Authorship in Ancient Greece, in T.J. Figureira - G. Nagy,
cds., Theognis of Megara: Poetry and the Polis, Baltimore - London 1985, 82-95 at
86.

¹⁰ Theog. 79-83; Hom. θ 166-77.

Both here and at the end of my paper my discussion of Nestor’s Cup relies on that
of Powell.

¹² It should be remembered, furthermore, that the inscription on the skyphos is a
conclusion of this paper).

Second, an example of oral poetry referring to a written text or rather to a kind of a written text occurs in the leave-taking scene in *Iliad* 2, where Hector imagines the words of someone in the future who beholds Andromache as a slavewoman (Z 460-61). The exegetical scholia remark that Hector’s words have an epigrammatic quality, and the same observation has been made by modern scholars concerning Hector’s words in Book H when he imagines what someone will say in the future beholding the tomb of his slain opponent (H 89-90). The funerary epigram, composed in hexameters (often a single hexameter) or in elegiac couplets, is already by the seventh century and probably earlier, a written poetic form. Its use is for inscriptions on stone. Although the *Iliad*’s fidelity to the picture of illiterate heroes prevents reference by Hector to an inscribed stele, his words nevertheless echo the style of the funerary epigram that was inscribed, written.

The next stage in the history of Greek intertextuality is the ambivalent text that is both the transcription of something composed for performance (leaving aside the question of whether writing was used in the composition or not) and also intended to be read and even studied. For this stage, again two examples.

The first is Aeschylean neologisms, and for these I refer to a monograph published by V. Citti in 1994. Citti showed that some, not all, of these neologisms, when they reappear in Sophocles or Euripides, prompt a comparison between the later poet’s reuse of them and their original use. In other words, the reuse is a deliberate allusion that contributes in some subtle way to the poet’s meaning. The question of the audience’s capacity to grasp such allusions immediately arises. Hearing the Aeschylean κρέος κοπεῖν μέλη in Euripides’ *Cyclops* (359), would the audience have remembered the *Persians* and the battle of Salamis? Citti appeals to the notion of ‘circles of competence’, and at the center of the circles he discovers a reading public. He says: «We are obliged to think... that a part, and

written text in a special sense: when someone reads the inscription, presumably aloud, he speaks for the object (n.b. the first person singular) and thus recites or performs what is written. G. Nagy, *Homer* *ic Questions*, TAPA 122, 1992, 17-64 at 35: «writing was being used as an equivalent to performance, not as a means for performance» (his emphasis).

not the least important part, of theatrical communication took place in a literary dialogue, conducted in a manner that for us evokes the manner of Alexandrian poetry, in the first place between poet and poet, and therefore for quite restricted circles of competence, in which the first and necessary condition was textual control of the ancient poet, so precise as to be impossible except on the basis of written texts. With Citti's observation one can compare Simon Goldhill's remarks on the differences within Aristophanes' audience and the effects of these differences on the perception of the parody of Euripides' Telephus in Acharnians and of Euripides and Aeschylus in Frogs.

The second example is the 'seal' of Theognis (19-26), which, it will be argued, is an ambivalent text, as those of Sophocles and Euripides must be, if Citti is right.

An opposition between the 'seal's' oral, performative and its written aspects emerges especially in lines 22-23 and by way of the relation of these lines to Homer. While it is obvious that Theognis here uses Homeric formulas, the peculiarities and effects of reuse will bear further observation. Theognis' ὥστε δὲ πῶς τις ἐρεῖ (22) conflates two Homeric formulas that extend from the beginning of the line to one or the other of the caesuras in the third foot. The formula ὥς ποτὲ τις ἐρεῖ is used three times in the Iliad to end a quotation, and of these three, two are in the speeches of Hector to which I have already referred. These are speeches in which he imagines what

14 Ibid., 165-66: «Dobbiamo pensare... che una parte, e non la meno significativa, della comunicazione teatrale sia avvenuta in un dialogo libresco, condotto in modo che per noi evoca quello della poetica alessandrina, anzi tutto tra poeta e poeta, e quindi per cerchi di competenza assai ristretti, in cui condizione prima e necessaria era il controllo testuale dell'opera del poeta antico, così puntuale da non poter essere fatta se non su testi scritti».


16 A much fuller statement of my argument, with fuller citation, will be found in The Seal of Theognis, forthcoming in Poet, Public, and Performance: Essays in Ancient Greek Literature and Literary History, ed. by me and R. Wallace (the papers from the conference in honor of B. Gentili held at the American Academy, Feb. 12, 1994).

someone will say in the future about Andromache as a slavewoman or about his slain foe.

In Theognis, however, the Homeric formula is introductory, not concluding; the speaker, Theognis, refers to himself, not to someone else; and the quotation refers to the future perception of him as successful and universally famous. Theognis thus reverses the connotations of the Homeric formula. The quotation introduced at lines 22-23 takes the epic model (quotation of a future speaker) and remakes it for the purpose of entitling a written handbook or collection of poems. It is not only the model or the form of the quotation that is remade. The poet of the seal reuses, in the quotation, the formula πάντως ἐπ’ ἄνθρωπος\(^\text{18}\) and reverses the Homeric usage of ὀνομαστός, which is only with a negative (‘not to be named’, ‘abominable’). Theognis thus matches the epic incorporation of written hexameter or elegy with an elegiac incorporation of oral epic.

R. Renehan has pointed out that Theognis, like Hesiod, names himself only once and that the names of both poets are to be found in the same verse (22) of their respective poems\(^\text{19}\). If, as Renehan suggests, the Theognidea in this way deliberately recalls Hesiod, then the seal has, in the lines under discussion (22-23), managed to combine allusion to Homer with allusion to the other great poet of archaic hexameter. The poet of the seal in effect alludes to the two as the pair that they were traditionally held to be\(^\text{20}\). The particular manner of the allusion to Hesiod might presuppose that the poet of the seal has counted the lines of the *Theogony* in a written text. But no matter what the poet’s method of observation of the position of the name of Hesiod, the parallel position of the name of Theognis, if deliberate, subtly calls attention to a new kind of composition, i.e. in writing, that can create allusions of a new, almost learned kind, unlike the allusions to Homer in the same lines, which need only the reader’s or listener’s so to speak general memory of Homeric formulas. The allusion to Hesiod is probably opaque to the listening symposiaist; it is only for a reader.

At what point does a text refer, as a written text, i.e. as a text

\(^{18}\) Hom. K 213, etc.


composed in writing, to another text as a written text? At what point does the first intertextuality directed to a reader occur? What is the first example?

As for prose, it seems that the first example should appear in the second prose work in the history of Greek literature, whatever it was, which would inevitably refer to the first prose work, whatever it was. But, looking through the fragments of Hecataeus, Acusilaos, Pherecydes, and Hellanicos, with their Old Testament-like genealogies and their folktale-like stories in paratactic style, one gets the impression that such intertextuality as they practiced was at the level of citation (of Homer or Hesiod, for example) or at the level of whole narratives, which would have been a form of contestation - my version of an event replaces someone else's version. The intertextuality of these writers was not, I think, at the level of diction.

There are three other bodies of early prose-writing that should be considered. One is the Hippocratic corpus, on which no comment will be offered here. The problems of dating and authenticity are discouraging, as are the simplicity of the prose and the explicitly polemical nature of the argumentation, which seems to preclude intertextuality in the sense in which I have been using the term. The second body of prose-writing is that of the pre-Socratic philosophers. Unlike the Ionian logographers, Heraclitus, Democritus, and Anaxagoras wrote an artistic prose that borrowed many devices from poetry. But whether there are intertextual relations amongst the pre-Socratics or whether there is an intertextual relation of this philosophical writing (again, as distinguished from explicit citation) to other kinds of writing, is difficult to say. (Empedocles and Parmenides and others who wrote in verse are yet another problem.) The third body of prose is fifth-century history. S. Hornblower's commentary on Thucydides I-II shows repeated implicit polemical allusion to Herodotus. Such allusion is in the nature of correction. It seems to me that a fairly precise knowledge of Herodotus is presupposed by this kind of allusion and thus a reading knowledge, even if Thucydides, in Book 1.21, seems to conceive of Herodotus in terms of oral performance. Another kind of allusion by Thucydides to Herodotus is one that could be called intertextual: Thucydides sometimes gives his narrative an «Herodotean touch»\textsuperscript{21} by the use of a distinctly Herodotean word

\textsuperscript{21} S. Hornblower, \textit{A Commentary on Thucydides}, I, Oxford 1991, 215. (I have not read Hornblower's article on Herodotus and Thucydides in the Hector Catling Festschrift; nor have I read Th. Scanlon, \textit{Echoes of Herodotus in Thucydides}: Self-
or phrase the effect of which is to evoke a scene or passage in Herodotus as coloring of the context in Thucydides.

Examples are Ξερξης ἵσθη (Xerxes was pleased 1.129.1) in reaction to Themistocles’ letter and ἄνδρ εὐζωνος (‘a man travelling light’ 2.97.1) in an ethnographic context.

Thucydides uses the phrase twice in this context and never elsewhere. Besides allusions of this kind, there is also allusion from Thucydides to Herodotus on a larger scale. The figure of the warner in Thucydides, Archidamos in Book I, Nicias in Book VI, is modelled on the warner in Herodotus, who himself has Homer as a model. While the first kind of allusion seems to presuppose a reading of Herodotus, the other kinds could be perceived by someone who had heard but not read Herodotus. So, as in the case of Sophoclean and Euripidean allusions to Aeschylus, it is probably necessary to think in terms of circles of competence.

What about the first intertextuality in poetry? A certain Pigres, called by the Suda the brother of Artemisia of Halicarnassus, is said to have gone through the Iliad adding a pentameter to each hexameter. It is difficult to see how he could have done so without the aid of a written copy of the Iliad, unless he had memorized the whole poem, and without putting his new version into writing. The one line of Pigres that survives, the second line of the rewritten Iliad, makes the Muse the source of sophia, and thus begins to accommodate the epic to what I believe is a specifically elegiac program. Pigres’ reuse of Homer is thus intertextual in the sense in which I am using the term, the sense, to repeat, that is normal in Classical studies.

Sufficiency, Admiration and Law, Historia 43, 1994, 143-76, of which I learned just as I finished this paper).

22 Another Herodotean-Homeric allusion is found at 2.12.3. G. Crane has suggested to me another example of this kind of allusion: the Athenians at Melos are modelled with ironic implications, on the embassy led by Alexander that brought a peace offer to the Athenians. For references for the warner, see Hornblower, 125.

23 I am grateful to R.P. Martin for reminding me per litteras electronicas of Pigres. Compare P. Scarron’s Virgile travesti en vers burlesques (1648-52), which is one of the examples discussed by G. Genette, Palimpsestes: La littérature au second degré, Paris 1982.


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For the history of intertextuality in Greek literature, we are on firmer ground when we come to Plato, who was a writer in a very familiar sense. There is the anecdote in Dionysius of Halicarnassus about the different versions of the first sentence of the Republic found on a writing tablet after Plato’s death. Plato could imitate any style necessary to his purposes. The speech of Lysias in the Phaedrus is so intertextual with the extant speeches of Lysias that it has sometimes been called a quotation of Lysias, not an imitation of Lysias by Plato.

When we come to the Alexandrian poets, we are of course at the point at which Greek studies join hands with Latin studies. In fact, G. Giangrande, one of the pioneers in the study of intertextuality in Alexandrian poetry, explicitly linked his project to G. Pasquali’s foundational - for Latin studies, that is - essay, L’Arte allusiva.

With Pasquali, I turn to a brief survey of intertextuality in Latin studies, a much more difficult project. First, Pasquali is not an absolute beginning. There were others before Pasquali. There was Pasquali before Pasquali, in the sense that the main idea about allusion is already in the Orazio lirico of 1920. And there was E. Norden in the background of Orazio lirico.

And yet one can speak, as G.B. Conte does, of a specifically Italian tradition that goes back to the 1942 essay.

In P.V. Cova, L’omerismo alessandrinstico dell’Eneide (1963), one finds citation of Pasquali’s article of 1942; one finds the concept of Homer as ‘model’, as distinguished from influence; in short, one finds an approach that would now be called intertextual. In Latin studies, the foremost representatives of this tradition, at least from an American point of view, are now Conte and A. Barchiesi. In the United States, there was a distinct tradition of intertextual studies that did not become aware of the Italian one until the time of the first translation of Conte’s work into English, in 1986, The Rhetoric of Imitation. In the

25 Comp. verb. 6.25.33; cf. Quint. 8.6.64; Diog. Laert. 3.37.
same year, R. Thomas, writing in *Harvard Studies* on intertextuality in Vergil’s *Georgics*, cites neither Conte nor any other Italian scholar. One can contrast the perspective of the Englishman Ol. Lyne, who, in the following year, 1987, in his chapter on allusions in the *Aeneid*, cites both Conte and Barchiesi. But if one goes back a few years in the history of English scholarship to 1979, to the collection of papers entitled *Creative Imitation and Latin Literature*, edited by D. West and T. Woodman, one finds no citation of Conte or Barchiesi or any other Italian, and almost no citation of Americans. Who are the scholarly antecedents of the notion of ‘creative imitation’? My guess is that these antecedents are German scholars writing before the Second World War. To turn again to the U.S., when did the American tradition, also parochial, start, and what were its sources? There were the articles on the *Aeneid* and Homer published by W.S. Anderson in 1957 and 1963. There was W. Clausen’s article *Callimachus and Latin Poetry* in 1964. Clausen’s influence was great. His student D. Ross was the teacher of R. Thomas at Michigan. When Thomas went to teach at Harvard in the late 1970s, he came into direct contact with Clausen, and I believe that this contact had an influence on Thomas’ work. J. Zetzel, who entered into controversy with Thomas over intertextuality in Catullus, was also a student of Clausen. One could also mention P. Knox, D. Kubiak, and other Americans who were influenced by Clausen through studying with him.

On the basis of the surveys that I have now given, I shall say what I see as the major gains and what I see as problems that remain for further study.

The major gains achieved by intertextual studies in Greek and especially in Latin are four. First, typology: I refer in particular to the typologies of allusion in Latin poetry proposed by Ol. Lyne and by R. Thomas and to the theoretically based typologies of G. D’Ippolito. Second, hand-in-hand with typology, came a nuanced under-

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standing of the functions of intertextuality. The first step had already been taken by Pasquali, whose main point was in fact that what he called ‘allusion’ had an artistic function. Within the Italian tradition, already in the early 1970s, Conte conceived of this function as analogous to that of the rhetorical figure32. The typologies of Lyne and Thomas included many subtle observations on the function of allusion. Third, the study of intertextuality, again within the Italian tradition, led to a distinction between between allusion at the level of individual words and passages, and allusion at the level of genre or system or poetic langue. This distinction was advanced by Conte in Virgilio: il genere e i suoi confini (1984) and, in the same year, by Barchiesi in La traccia del modello: effetti omerici nella narrazione virgiliana33. Fourth is the metapoetic aspect of intertextuality, which has emerged especially in study of post-Augustan literature34. D. Kennedy has observed a «recent consensus» that «post-Virgilian epic is to be read as a response to the cultural authority of the Aeneid», and the self-consciousness of this response produces the metapoetic35.

Of the major problems that appear to remain, the first is intentionality, the question πασι μέλις ασ as V. Citti has called it36. Pasquali understood allusion strictly in terms of the intentions and even the biography of the poet. For example, Vergil’s allusion to Varius,


33 See the comments in Conte, Memoria, 120-21 (in a postscript to the 1974 edition).


36 Citti, Eschilo, 164 n. 11.
«l’amico del suo cuore», was a compliment. Vergil’s intentions could also be rivalrous and thus take the form of emulation, a form of intention that Pasquali stressed. Conte and Barchiesi, on the other hand, would exclude intention from the discussion of intertextuality. J. Farrell, in his study of intertextuality in Vergil’s Georgics, states that the student of allusion «cannot simply wish the problem away» and «is on some level concerned with a poet’s intention».

The reader is the second problem. Whether we speak of the author’s intention or of the effect of the text, we presuppose a reader. In Pasquali’s view, every kind of allusion depended on a reader. «Allusions do not produce their intended effect except on a reader who clearly recalls the text to which reference is made».

The reader is important in Conte’s understanding of intertextuality, too. In the preface to Generi e lettori (1991), he distinguishes between the reader-addresssee (lettore-destinatario) and the reader-interpreter (lettore-interprete), and defines the former as «a form of the text; it is the figure of the recipient as anticipated by the text. To this prefiguration of the reader, all future, virtual readers must adapt themselves». The difference between Pasquali and Conte is that one sees the reader in terms of an effect intended by the author, the other sees the reader as an effect of the text.

The subject of intertextuality and the reader prompts several suggestions. First, to return for a moment to the first problem, which was intentionality, it seems to me that if we subordinate ‘intentional’ to ‘conscious’, we can do justice to the function of the author and at the same time reach a more nuanced description of the reader’s rela-

37 Conte, Memoria, 114; Conte-Barchiesi, Imitazione, 88-93; and Lyne’s latest work, Further Voices.


39 G. Pasquali. L’arte allusiva, L’Italia che scrive 25, 1942, 185-87. Repr. in Stravaganze quarte e supreme, Venezia 1951, 11-20 and in Pagine stravaganti, II, Firenze 1968, 275-82. My references are to the last of these. The sentence quoted, which refers to the reader of Horace and Vergil, is at 275: «[L]e allusioni non producono l’effetto voluto se non su un lettore che si ricordi chiaramente del testo cui si riferiscono».

tion to the text. In fact, on the basis of the distinction between conscious and unconscious, it becomes possible to give a logically complete account of every possible relation between reader and text or author. Such an account is provided by W. Füger.  

My second suggestion concerns the Model Reader, as Conte sometimes calls his text-determined reader. This concept of the Model Reader is discussed systematically in U. Eco, *Lector in Fabula*, with reference to an already extensive literature. I believe that the concept is already problematic in Eco and earlier, but I will confine my remarks to the use of the concept in the field of Classics. M.G. Bonanno has recently distinguished between different kinds of readers, and Citti, as said, has appealed to the notion of circles of competence in his discussion of intertextuality in Euripides.

In his discussion of the marking of intertextual reference, Füger reached the paradox that, the more clearly marked the reference, the more inaccessible it is to the reader. Instead, then, of a single Model Reader, perhaps we should think of a variety of readers, amongst whom intertextuality functions as a discriminatory principle.

My third suggestion concerns the situation, fully described by Füger, of the reader who is completely unconscious of a reference to an earlier text. In our reading of ancient literature, this unconsciousness is sometimes determined by the loss of the relevant pre-texts. Pasquali had already stated in *L'arte allusiva* his belief that it was «certissimo» that most of the allusions in Vergil and other Roman poets to their contemporaries escape us. Only by chance do we have the lines of Varro of Atax preserved by Servins or the lines of Varius preserved by Macrobius that permit us to grasp certain Vergilian allusions. But, even when the reader is hypothetically capable of grasping an allusion, he may miss it. Even as he misses it, he may also have some non-intertextual understanding and enjoyment of the text, just as we do in the case of Vergil, where most allusions to his


43 Bonanno, *L'allusione*, 34.

44 Citti, *Eschilo*.

contemporaries are lost along with their works. If we think of the non-comprehension of intertextuality on a broad, historical scale, in the history of reception, it becomes even clearer that an author, like Vergil in the Middle Ages, may be highly prized for long periods of time by multitudes of readers who are unaware of his intertextual dimension. I conclude that, whereas intertextuality may be necessary in the writing of texts, it is unnecessary in their reading.

My fourth suggestion about the reader starts from this notion of the history of reception just invoked. Whereas Conte and others assume a static relation of reader, text, and earlier text, the fact is that, after the moment of the initial reception of a text, there is never a reader who has not read subsequent texts. The question therefore arises of the effect of later texts on the perception of texts and their references to earlier texts. Conte’s essay on Lucretius, Instructions for a Sublime Reader: Form of the Text and Form of the Addressee in Lucretius’ De rerum natura is a useful case. This essay was originally published as the introduction to a translation of Lucretius in the Classici Rizzoli (1990). The reader-addressee of Lucretius, as described by Conte, is based on pseudo-Longinus’ concept of the sublime. Conte uses pseudo-Longinus to describe what the reader of Lucretius experiences.

In other words, his description of the sublime reader depends upon his use of an author, pseudo-Longinus, who lived long after Lucretius and whose concept of the sublime could not be a projection of the text of Lucretius. Conte’s construction of the sublime reader thus embodies an intertextual procedure that I believe is common and indeed inevitable: the reading of a text in terms of later texts that the author of the target text did not know and could not have anticipated. The historical distance of the reader from the text produces a surplus of intervening texts that influence his reading. In the case of Conte’s reading of Lucretius, the model of the sublime reader deriving from pseudo-Longinus caused him to be most aware of Empedocles as an

46 Cf. A. Barchiesi, La traccia del modello: effetti omerici nella narrazione virgiliana, Pisa 1984, 120: «Voglio dire che il riferimento a Omero è senza'altro costituivo del testo... ma non è per nulla indispensabile alla corretta decifrazione del testo».

47 Conte, Generi, 9-52: «Insegnamenti per un lettore sublime: forma del testo e forma del destinatario nel De rerum natura di Lucrezio».

48 Conte, Generi, 26ff.
earlier text and to minimize other kinds of intertextuality, for example, the diatribe.

The third problem that I find is the concept of the text that underlies intertextual studies in Classics. I introduce this problem by comparing the philological and the post-structural concepts of the text.

Classicists use ‘text’ in two ways. First, to mean «The wording adopted by an editor as (in his (or her) opinion) most nearly representing the author’s original work; a book or edition containing this; also, with qualification, any form in which a writing exists or is current, as a good, bad corrupt, critical, received text»\(^{49}\). To establish a text representing an ancient author’s original work was for centuries the primary and most honorable function of the classical scholar, and the critical edition was the chef d’oeuvre of classical studies. The second way in which classicists, or some classicists, use ‘text’ is quite different. I shall take another example from Conte’s preface to his Genres and Readers, where he speaks of «the text itself» and «the text... conceived and structured per se»\(^{50}\). ’Text’ here clearly means ‘original work’ and, since the reference is to poetry, to the original work as an esthetic object, which is assumed to be structured, unitary, and complete. It has these qualities because it expresses some anterior meaning that it intends to communicate. I would call attention to Conte’s stress on communication in the pages from which I quoted those phrases on the text. We can then translate Conte’s ‘text itself’ into ‘work itself’. If we compare this second use of ‘text’ with the first, it seems that some classicists - Conte is hardly alone, I should add-would like to conflate the material fixity and substantiality of the critical edition with the ideal permanence of the work of literature.

For a post-structuralist concept of the text, there are several possibilities. As Kristeva was the first to theorize and to name intertextuality, her concept of the text will here be taken as an example. In the first place, her concept was intended, very much in the spirit of the 1960s, as a revolutionary, Marxist one. The term ‘text’ was itself polemical. She used this term to argue against the concept of the

\(^{49}\) OED s.v. ‘text’ 1.d.

work of literature as a real object endowed with esthetic value. In her perspective, the work of literature was only an ideological phenome-
non. She replaced it with the concept of the text as ‘signifying practice’. As an object of exchange between a sender (destinateur) and a receiver (destinataire), the ‘signifying practice’ is a ‘process of production of sense’, and it is studied as ‘structuration’, as distin-
guished from structure. A text is therefore a ‘productivity’, which
means that it stands in a ‘redistributive (destructive-constructive)’ relation to the language in which it is written...\(^51\) Given this redistributive relation of text to language, one can see that intertextuality was going to enter the picture. The literary text in particular Kristeva spoke of as a ‘paragram’. She said: «The literary text presents itself as a system of multiple connections that one could describe as a structu-
re of paragrammatic networks (réseaux). We use the term paragram-
matic network for the tabular (non-linear) model of the elaboration of the literary image, in other words, the dynamic, spatial graphism designating the pluridetermination of sense (different from the semantic and grammatical norms of ordinary language) in poetic language. The term network replaces univocity (linearity) while including it, and suggests that each ensemble (sequence) is the end and the beginning of a plurivalent relation. In this network, the elements present themselves as the highpoints of a graph..., which will help us to formalize the symbolic function of language as dynamic mark, as moving ‘gram’ (thhus as paragram) that makes rather expresses a meanings»\(^52\).

My purpose is not to say which concept of the text should be preferred; I would only point out how diverse are the concepts of intertextuality that follow from the two concepts of the text, the philological and the post-modern. For Kristeva, as the text belongs, in virtue of its linguistic basis, to a social-historical ensemble regarded as already a textual ensemble, intertextuality is the interaction of codes that is produced in a single text. Kristeva says: «Intertextuality is a notion that will be the index of the manner in which a text reads

\(^{51}\) Problèmes de la structuration du texte, in Théorie d’ensemble, Paris 1968, 297-316 at 311-12.

history and inserts itself in history. The concrete mode of realization of intertextuality in a given text will confirm the major characteristic ('social', 'esthetic' [etc.]) of a textual structure.\(^{53}\)

To take Conte as an example again, intertextuality operates within a specifically literary history\(^{54}\). He speaks of the «cardinal and privileged role of memory within poetry», which seems to exclude or override any contemporary literary strands of the textual network. He has the notion of a «chain of poetic discourse» in which individual poems find their place\(^{55}\). He has a very strong sense of an autonomous poetic tradition as the locus of intertextuality\(^{56}\). In this respect, he is still close to the estheticism of Pasquali. In short, for Conte, intertextuality is a matter of a poem's relation to the past, to its particular literary past, whereas, for Kristeva, intertextuality is a matter of a poem's relation to its present.

As an example of Conte's relation to the philological concept of the text, I refer again to the essay on Lucretius. Conte allows that «Lucretius ends up making different discursive structures collude with one another»\(^{57}\), and he mentions in particular the philosophic diatribe, with its sarcasm and moralism and its favorite themes of misery, exile, old age, and death. Conte is in fact the author of an important article on the diatribe in Lucretius. But Conte's presuppositions cause him to rule out the intertextual force of the diatribe in the *DRN*. The diatribe is «a field of expressive counterforces that dissent from the sublime but almost always end up being cancelled out by it»\(^{58}\).

The fourth problem is already implicit in the example that I have just taken from the work of Conte: it is the problem of the relation of the text to the non-literary historical context from which it emerged. How can a text belong to an autonomous literary tradition, expressed

\(^{53}\) *Problèmes*, 311: «Pour le sujet connaissant, l'intertextualité est une notion qui sera l'indice de la façon dont un texte lit l'histoire et s'insère en elle. Le mode concret de réalisation de l'intertextualité dans un texte précis donnera la caractéristique majeure ('sociale,' 'éthétique') d'une structure textuelle».

\(^{54}\) Conte, *The Rhetoric*, 49.


\(^{56}\) Especially *ibid.*, 42-43.

\(^{57}\) Conte, *Generi*, 31 = *Genere*, 42: «Lucrezio si trova a far colludere diverse strutture discorsive insieme».

\(^{58}\) Conte, *Generi*, 32 = *Genere*, 42: «campo di contro-forze espressive che dissentono dal sublime, ma quasi sempre finiscono per annullarsi in esso».
in its diachronic intertextual dimension, and, at the same time, maintain a synchronic intertextual relation to the non-literary codes of the social and political milieu in which it was created? How to read a line like *o nata mecum consule Manlio* (Hor. c. 3.21.1), which is hymnal\(^{59}\), borrows the language and form of a label on a wine jar\(^{60}\), and may also, as A. Zissos has suggested to me, echo Cicero's *o fortunatam natam me consule Romam*\(^{61}\)? It seems that it would be useful for historically oriented scholarship to have a concept of intertextuality that would permit the reconciliation of these various kinds of allusion or reference.

In conclusion, I return briefly to the conflicting concepts of the text outlined above. The autonomy of the text was the cornerstone of philology and thus, for a long time, of the discipline of Classics. The idea of the critical edition and the idea of the work (the poem, the oration, or whatever) are easily conflated, and the autonomy of the text becomes a principle for all other kinds of research. But, without committing itself to a boundless, borderless text, without committing itself to an endless play of traces and differences, classical scholarship could still work with a more open concept of the text that would remove texts from an exclusively literary history and restore them to the rest of the history in which they participated (I mean without restricting them to the status of documents for the biography of the author). This larger notion of the text might already be a consequence of, for example, the work that has been done on the relation between iconography and written texts. One also thinks of O. Murray's observations on the Callimachean graffito on the wall of the Auditorium of Maecenas\(^{62}\). As he says, the graffito puts us on a border, very difficult to define, between poetry and life. The larger notion could be expanded to the relation between texts and other bodies of discourse that, although not written, are defineable as, let us say, kinds of discourse, and therefore susceptible of discussion as intertextuality. Then it would be necessary to rewrite the survey of intertextuality that I gave,


\(^{60}\) Cf. *CIL* IV 255.1 = Dessau 8584; *CIL* XV 4539 = Dessau 8580; *CIL* XV 4571 = Dessau 8581.


beginning with Nestor’s cup.

The inscription on the cup begins with a line of prose or perhaps an iambic trimeter. This line not only alludes to the cup of the Homeric Nestor but is also a type of graffito, a proprietary formula. The inscription continues with two dactylic hexameters probably modelled on Homeric ones but composed in a spirit of parody. The first of the hexameters, like the very first line of the inscription, also imitates a kind of graffito, a curse formula: «Whoever steals this cup...». But here the formula is varied to: «Whoever drinks from this cup...» and then the second hexameter completes the thought para prosdokian. «He will be seized by the desire of Aphrodite». It has been suggested that the division of the lines, all three written in retrograde, reflects the practice of the symposium by which the invitation to sing passed from one guest to the next. Even if this suggestion is unfounded, the fact remains that the inscription represents an intertextuality in which both poetic and non-poetic texts serve as models and are synthesized, through parody and imitation, in a new text. In the beginning, then, was intertextuality, and a rather complex one, too.\(^{63}\)

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\(^{63}\) I am grateful for many interventi and for private conversations at the conference at Cagliari Nov. 24-6, 1994. All have contributed to this paper. It would be impossible to name everyone. The intellectual encounters with S. Rossetti Favento, S. Impellizzeri, and E. Degani are an especially vivid memory.