The present paper has been prompted by two contributions to the Trento 2000 conference which can be found printed in Lexis 19 (2001). One was by Dr. Medda, on the attribution of lines at Agam. 1649-54 and such notorious problems as that of the ἐνδικτεύοντα who are sprang on us so unexpectedly at v. 1650. The other was by Prof. Miralles, who considered a passage so much less notorious that its oddity has passed unobserved by almost every one, but is none far less real for all that, namely «What is Dionysus doing in the prologue to the third play of the Orestes?». Each of these scholars has taken the entirely responsible attitude: «This is what the text says: it is difficult, and it needs explanation. Here then is the explanation I offer, and each of them has done all that could possibly be done to surmount the problems they confront. What I offer now is a more drastic solution: to cure, at a single stroke, many of the ills in the two passages concerned, by suggesting that what we are looking at is not the work of Aeschylus at all, and so should not be judged by the ordinary canons of Aeschylean language and technique.

Curious things happen at the end of Agamemnon. We know from Klytaimnestra's own lips, and we see with our own eyes (1379 ff.), that it was she who dealt the fatal blows which killed the King. Now, at the end of the play, the chorus speak to Aigisthos, accusing him not of committing the murder, but of plotting it: the role of a woman (1625 ff.). So far, so good: Klytaimnestra has done the deed like a man, and Aigisthos has fulfilled the function of a woman. But now the roles are suddenly reversed. Is this simply for reasons of characterisation - to depict Aigisthos as a vainglorious coward? And do we then acquisite in watching Klytaimnestra stand by without saying a word by way of correction? Or is there another explanation?

Before we make up our minds, let us see what else catches our surprise. We may start with 1631 εἰς ἔξωτον: has no object. If νεκρόν: δίκαιον was in the accusative case, we would have perfectly normal Greek. Metre rules out any such possibility. So Denniston-Pege writes Se. ῥών δικαίωτα. That is quite a big securr. Schneider's idea that νεκρόν (1630) is the object is grammatically, but only grammatically, a much more plausible explanation. We may add two other points which we borrow from Fraenkell: 1. ἔξωτον is unique. 2. Even ἐξωτικός is unknown to tragedy.

An unfortunate beginning, but it gets worse, for immediately we face δέκτος in the sense, we are told, 'take into custody'. «As so often», says Fraenkell, citing Sept. 349, διδάσκει δ' ἐκ θεών, φησί, τα δε περιφέρει. The model is Hom. I. 594, as Prof. Zimmermann's paper (pp. 191 sq.) reminds us. Were it not for that model we
might be quite perplexed, since so far as tragedy is concerned, or even Pindar for that matter, we have no parallels. Heerodatus often uses διο of people being led off into captivity as in the Homer passage, but always in a context which makes the meaning plain (e.g. 2.152: έν διοικοθησθαι διήγησεν Ἰππίας, and often accompanied by words like λάβων, οἶκοι ἔρχονται... διόθεντος (6.91.2). The apos choruses are hardly the prizes of war. Even if they were the way this passage is laid out is extremely peculiar. Let us pretend we have a fragment. It begins "Your voice is the opposite of Orpheus's, for he used to dye everything by his delightful voice, but you with your silly yapping... then what? We expect something like, in a more poetic form, ήστερα beautifully, and ἔξωνας seems to confirm that expectation. But then what we get is "will be dyed". It seems as though some context is intended between Orphēus as a sort of prototype of the pied piper of Hamelin, and the chorus in twelve of the two. But the context simply does not work, even though by using ἄνωτρως the poet has just got the idea of animals being turned in his mind - as if the chorus had up to now been behaving as savage beasts who need to be κραταί. Lastly, within this confined passage we have the strange phraseology of ἀπό τὸν φανερόν (2). It is not surprising that scholars in the past, taking the words as genuine Aeschylus, have found them hard to swallow. But if they are not by Aeschylus..."

In 1634 f. we will accept without enthusiasm the doubtful negative, and contain our surprise that the obvious correction to οὗ ταυτάς was apparently not made before Lobos. But consider the logic. Aigisthos threatens the chorus with disciplinary action. The chorus never "As if you are going to be the tyrant over the Argives". Well, who else is going to be? Scaean is doubtless intended, but it fails because Aigisthos certainly will be the tyrant. Aigisthos's response to the jibe is the peculiar. He has been accused of planting Aigisthos' murder, but of lacking the nerve to execute it. This corresponds with the facts of the play as we have seen it develop. So what reply should Aigisthos make to this taunt? That is not an easy question to answer, but the reply which he does make is a complete non sequitur. "Trickery was clearly a woman's role; as for me, I was a suspect from long ago. Frankel does not face the difficulty. Derin's Loge do, and explain that Dol. 10.11 does not, as the word itself would suggest, refer to the planing, but to the fact that the deed involved the use of trickery."

That comes close to saying that Dol. 10.11 does not mean διολογεῖν. In what way was trickery involved in the deed as opposed to the planning? The deed involved primarily the use of an axe. True, at Cho 1003 the other item, the net, is called a δολομάτιον, but only after it has been called a number of other things. Nor is our sentence improved by στοίχεια as its last word. If this line had been different in its final two syllables, and suggestions for filling the gap had been avoided, any modern critic
who suggested that the gap between the two, and is doubly unfortunate in a context where secret, covert planning is the subject.

The gap in thought between 1637 and 1638, between feminine wiles and male reluctance to act on the one hand, and the utilisation of Agamemnon's wealth as a basis for wielding political power on the other, well merits Hermann's comment: "minima abrupta opum Agamemnonisicientes. Franckel swallows Klaussen's defence that as tyrant Agamemnon's prime need was for money for his minions. So it may have been, if we consider the matter as one of Realpolitik in ancient Argos following an assassination. But our concern is not what the political situation might have been in the real world, but with the language actually used in the passage before us, which leaves unsaid the things that would need to be said if there is to be a smooth and natural transition from feminine plotter/persuader - suspect male enemy of the royal house to the later's exploitation of seized financial assets. The disjunction of themes is made all the more noticeable by the 'great rarity' (Dantejun-Pape) of the word order εξ τοῦ δὲ τοῦχο Κριομέτρου for εξ τοῦ τοῦνυν, and by the abnormal use of οὖτι με with an epithet, not a verb. Note that we should lay too much stress on that second objection, for με as a possible corruption of μεν belongs to the category of the routine, and routine corruption is not proof that the passage in which it is embedded is not authentic.

It is significant that the chorus take no notice of the threat which has just been directed at them, and at 1643 revert to the male/female aspects of the murder. "Why didn't you kill this man here yourself?" or "why yourself?" In itself this might be used as an argument that if 1641-45 prove that 1638-42 are spurious, then 1643-48 must itself be authentic. However, we may have to reckon with one interpolator, but more than one, just as we do at the end of Odysseus Rex. Alternatively we may simply say that the quality of the incorporated passage is poor and ill thought out. I prefer the latter explanation because, unlike the end of Odysseus Rex, the style is uniform throughout - uniformly bad, this is. We will find that verdict justified if we look at the detail of what is said.

We start with 1643. "Why didn't you kill this man yourself in the cowardice of your heart?" (So Franckel). But the cowardice of your heart answers the very question put. You could legitimately say 'You shriam from killing him in the cowardice of your heart', but if you are going to formulate a question with this αὐθεντεύω idiom, you should be writing not ἀυθεντεύω καίδεκα but something like εἰὶς αὐθεντεύω φανερώς as is 1302: why did you not have the courage to kill him yourself?

Then in 1644 we are bound to have misgivings over Denniston-Pape's defence of ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ γυνηῖ. «Legisthus has claimed full credit for the deeds. But he hasn't. At
1604 he called himself only the ἀρχιερεύς, and explicitly said that he was ὘ρθός, absent, from the actual commission of the deed. It is the chorus who say at 1613 ἐνω ὁ ἡκτὶ καταταξαίνει, but then instantly modify their words to «alone plotted this murder». Comparison with other adverbial occurrences of πάνω listed in LSJ s.v. εἰπεῖ shows just how odd the present example is: the nuance is always «and ... as well» never «but together with». Spanheim gave us what logic requires, νῦν, for πάνω, and Page cites ἐνομίζει in the sparse apparatus of the Oxford text. West does not include it in his own edition, doubtless feeling the force of Denniston-Page's perfectly justified comment that the change is «in itself unlikely». This kind of impasse, where the text can just about be swallowed, but only with much misgiving and by a massive effort of will, meets us many times in the closing scenes of Agamemnon, and leaves us with the feeling that it is incompetence, rather than corruption, that is staring us in the face.

An impasse of a different kind, where there is no fault in logic, and may be none in linguistic usage, immediately follows. How are we to construe ν. 1645, χαίρας μιᾶς ευς τεῦχε καταφεύγων? The impasse this time takes the form of forcing us to choose between elegant style and normal grammar. If ν. 1645 is in straight apposition to γυνεί, all runs smoothly. There is no difficulty in having a person described as a μιᾶς ευς: cf. Soph. OT 97, 241. But it does mean that the description is given in hindsight, for it is too vigorous to be a mere condemnation of Kytaymeira's previous adulterous conduct. She is only a μιᾶς ευς after she has done the murder. So although linguistically unproblematic in sense, this interpretation is inferior to the one preferred by Franksel, taking ν. 1645 as being in apposition to the whole sentence, which boils down to saying that the σεφετέσθαι is what constitutes the μιᾶς ευς. Stilistically this is the more elegant way of taking the sentence. The same is, as Franksel himself sees, having the appositional phrase 1645 in front of the verb to which it stands in apposition is highly abnormal.

That was a problem which the scholarly mind may solve by spinning a coin. The same cannot be said of 1646-48. We begin with ἄρα. This either introduces a question (Franksel) or a statement (Denniston-Page). In support of the latter we are referred to Cho. 435, διάρκειαν ἄρα τείνεται. But there ἄρα meets Denniston's criticism (Greek Pericles, 63) of making realisation of the truth, or drawing a conclusion. There, in Cho. 435, we have «The whole tale you have told is one of dishonour, well then, she shall pay for that dishonour». There is no such inferential tone here in ἄρες. ἄρα must introduce a question, as West prints it. For the question to work we would take πάνω as "perhaps" not as "somewhere", notwithstanding the suitability of "somewhere" as a pronominal for ἄρα. «Do Creastes perhaps alive... » is a question to unsettle the would-be tyrant. However, all that is by the way, and does not impinge on the question of authenticity.
What does impinge is the clause ἔνεις... ἐγένετο in 1647 f., on which there is no note in the current editions. There should be, for it is a final clause, whereas what we need is a consecutive clause. «Does Orestes perhaps enjoy the light of the sun (is he still alive) in order that he may with luck come back and kill this pair?» is impet. «Is Orestes perhaps alive, and so may come back and kill this pair?» is much more the sense required. The author must have meant to say this, but he has not in fact said it.

In 1648 we must look askance at the third person whose pair here is for the more obvious second person «the pair of you». Commentators do the only possible thing, and allege that the words are not spoken directly to Agisthotis, but are an aside to be heard only by the audience. Well, which words? From «Orestes» (1646) onward, says Frankel! but can we think of any place in Greek tragedy where the first two syllables of an anacrusis line are addressed to some particular person, and the rest to an audience (or to themselves, which amounts to the same thing), while the previous addressee is struck by a sudden and convenient deafness? The lines are in any case much more effective as a threat than as abstract musings, and it is indeed as a threat that Agisthotis, not deaf after all, it appears, seems to take them in 1649, ἄλλα τίτλα δεξίως ταῦτα ἔρχεται καὶ λέγεις, γυμνὸς τόρος. But with 1649 we move into even murkier waters. First there is τῶν ἐρωτο&omicron;ν, 'to do this'. To do what? The chōra are doing nothing. Then γυμνὸς τόρος. What is the object of γυμνὸς? It does not need one, say, the commentators, and we are referred to Eur. Her. 65, Suppl. 580, and Theocritus 22. 63 and 26. 19. The first runs: «You won't take me or these people away by force». γυμνὸς το&omicron;n - «you are evidently not much of a prophet». The second: «What kind of a warrior can come from a dragon?» Answer: «You'll find out the hard way» - γυμνός σά να τάσαγεσαι. In both cases what is to be supplied with γυμνὸς is immediately obvious from the context. The Theocritan examples are no different. Now there may be a licence in our texts at 1658 f. as West supposes, and if we wanted to make 1649 f. conform to what we apprehend to be good style and grammar, we could easily imagine one here too, as some scholars have done in the past (Frankel, 780 n. 3). The omission of a line beginning with ε&omicron;I, preceding two other lines beginning with ε&omicron;Ia, is certainly a possibility. But on the face of it we must add γυμνὸς to our list of things which are not totally unintelligible but which fail to speak to us in impeccable Greek.

In 1650 ε&omicron;Ia 5 is unique (except for the immediate repetition) in tragedy. It is with such steps that interlocutors give themselves away; compare the injudicious δ&omicron;Iαδ&omicron;I at OT 1591. In the same line the question of who the λαμ&omicron;Γα&omicron;n may be is one to which Dr. Muragid has addressed himself. He has rightly expressed dissatisfaction with the theory so far advanced on who these worthies may be, and urges us to believe that they are an hitherto invisible force on whom Agisthotis may call. Doubtless in real life such a man would have his own bodyguard, but even in Choephora and
Sophocles Electra (v. 36) they see only a notional body of men, not actual persons on stage. And one must wonder why Agisthos, of all people, should address his followers in so genial a fashion as to call them ϕιλοι. To be set against these we have the equally hitherto invisible force of honest burghers on whom the chorus can call at this moment of crisis, persons who are comprehensively addressed as πάντες τις. It is a pity that they were unavailable at the time of the king's murder when the chorus ineffectively wrung their hands at 1346-71. The question of who the λοιποί and who the πάντες τις people may be is bound up with the attribution of lines; and on that topic I have nothing to contribute beyond an expression of surprise that it has apparently not yet been suggested (but surely it must have been, by some one, somewhere) that 1650 and 1651 are alternative versions of the same line, like those we find several times, particularly in the early part, in Sophocles Trachiniae.

Springing two shadowy hands of men on us at the very end of the play is as implausible as the old idea that the old men of the chorus suddenly start waving swords about. As Dr. Medda has pointed out, they were on their own admission physically pretty far off ten years before. Implausible, that is, if we continue with the tacit assumption that these are lines written by Aeschylus. Tragic convention seems to be flouted. But is there anything in the actual words which points to non-Aeschylean authorship? Dr. Medda has acutely observed something odd in 1651: πάντες τις is never found with imperatives or horatory utterances. It belongs rather to ἀνάργυροι. From the whole of Greek tragedy Dr. Medda has only been able to find three contrary instances. One is from a "serious" play (Rhesus 687); another is from a play which is very heavily interpolated, and from a section labelled by Dr. Diggle as certainly not by Euripides (Did 1598 f.); and the third, in a modified form, πάντες ὅστις at Soph. Ai. 1413 E., comes in a part of the play which for a multiplicity of reasons has been condemned as apocryphal, and is printed as such in the Teubner "froses. If you believe that a line is to be judged by the company it keeps, you will not struggle to read 1651 as the work of Aeschylus.

πρόκειται (1652) is doubtless corrupt, but in any case has no bearing on the question of authenticity. The next line, however, seems once again to face us with the problem that the sense intended is clear enough, even if we do not know for sure who is speaking to whom; the scope for emendation is very limited; but the line fails to match up to our expectations of Aeschylean Greek. At the end of a long note Finisken says that the literal sense cannot be other than "You say you have been killed."

Denniston-Page agree, resorting to the ingenious solution of writing υτί for υτε: "We accept the omen when you say σιναστελλ. (That proposal was made by a pair of unlikely bedfellows, Edgar Lobel and Archibald Campbell). Baydes had a solution worth considering: ζωστεσις meets the objection of tense, eliminates the unwelcome ot, and presupposes the phonetic confusion of on and e, just as in Dorat's
Philosophia 1630:175: Xenophon 24-26

ϕυσιαία ηττω στις τα χαρακτήρα αποτελεί κατάλληλος τετελεσμένος τάξεως. Αν δεν είναι μηδέποτε τυχαίο το αυτόματα ότι η διάσταση της φύσης διατηρείται συμβατικά ή αναλογικά. Φημίζεται ότι φαίνεται στη συνέχεια, εάν στην ιστορία, μετατρέποντας την είδος της εικόνας. Ενδέχεται με την τελική στιγμή, αλλά είναι επάρκεια για την επίτευξη της συνέχειας. Σε μια συμβατικά ολοκληρωμένη συνεχεία, η διάσταση της φύσης παραμένει συμβατικά. Η φόβος θα πρέπει να είναι συμβατικά με την εικόνα, και η διάσταση της φύσης παραμένει συμβατικά με την εικόνα.
1657 aldión xéovnou, the respectable old man, is an abbreviation that pedantically that we may be tempted to overlook its deficiency in sense; it is in the highest degree improbable that Clytemnestra should address her enemies by this exceptionally respectful term (Demosthenes-Paige). That deficiency in sense is not the only one in this line. There are the dead bones, the xéovnou pérmámenou. One has every sympathy with Xen's desire to follow Madvig in giving us pérmámenou; πέραμαντίαν περιμένε, but there is no evidence that the plural perfect participial passive is ever so used. We know of ἀ περίμενεν and ἀ περιμένεσθαι 'I had been waiting,' but περιμένεσθαι as equivalent to ἀ περίμενε is something else again.

As we move over closer to the end of the play we find the text becoming more and more corrupt, and that it here derives so of even probable evidence for determining authenticity or its reverse. But there are still two other pieces which meet our criteria of being not obviously corrupt, and unpopular. The first is 1668 f. The author of these lines has failed to bring out the contrast - if indeed he intended one - between ἐκείνης σύνεσεις ἑξάκτης and παντικής. A de di of equivalent would have been welcome in 1669, and at the start of that line τοῦτον, which seems in vaudy vigorous prepositional to 'grow fat,' is not at all that well defended by the citation of four passages from Greek literature, one of which has ἐπούς, two others ἐπικοῦς, and the fourth is not a parallel in any case, because there πρόοἐν has an object.

We may pass over 1670 εἴσηνα τὸ ἦπως προήθηκεν ἀόρατος, for it can hardly be called offensive, though one can see that normal usage would have dispensed with the γεύον - and indeed some editors do eliminate it in favor of a replacement. The comma instead of 1672 προτοῦ should take the accusative, as it does at Eur. 640, 739. Fraenkel tries to refute this by saying that a negative οὐκ ἂν with the genitive is a peculiarly Attic construction. What he means is that Aristeas Plut. 993 and Eur. Alc. 761 have οὐκ ἂν προτοῦ with a genitive, where the ἔμμεν plainly makes a difference. The further citation of Thesp. 864.5 is inconclusive, since if the sparse apparatus to the Oxford text is to be trusted, all manuscripts but one do fact in there offer the accusative.

Let us summarise the position. No one can deny that the end of Aegisthous suffer from serious corruption. But it also suffers from something else: a plethora of expressions which are not demonstrably corrupt, which offer translatable Greek of a kind, but which in some cases offend against normal Attic syntax, and which after time have written with a feeling of disappointment amounting to incredulity. On p. 789 in volume II of his commentary, Fraenkel has a footnote which quotes the following from Aristophilus o.165: 'he does not altogether please me, but I see nothing better to be done. Had I been writing the lines myself I would have said δηχούμενος καταφέν καθευ.' Fraenkel comments: 'This confusion suggests wonderful possibilities of a verse-composition match of English schools against.
Anchylus of Athens, and it is at the same time so delightful in its self-suggesting that I cannot forbear to quote it. The ponderous Frankel is anxious not to accuse of a lack of humour. But in a way Platt has put his finger on what is characteristic of the shortcomings of the end of Agamemnon. If the portion of the play which we have been reviewing were submitted as an entry for the Putnam prize at Cambridge University, kindly examiners might take the candidate to one side and tactfully explain why they were unable even to award him an honourable mention. If we ask ourselves whether we can think of anywhere else in the texts of Greek tragedy where we are assiduous by misgivings of an exactly similar kind, the answer is yes, we can. The end of Oedipus Rex is the culprit, which like the end of Agamemnon begins to go off the rails in its irrelevancy, but only teaches the full flower of its incompetence in its bombastic mannerisms. Frankel in his note on 1649 ff had observed: «In all that remains to us of Greek drama the only parallel to be found - and it is a very close one - is in the final scene of the Oedipus Rex. When Frankel wrote those words, questions of authenticity were not in his mind. But in view of what he has said, if the end of Oedipus Rex is spurious, it must cast a shadow over the end of Agamemnon.» That the end of the Sophoclean play really is spurious is something I have suspected, and I believe myself to have contributed to the proof of this in the article I published in LIMN n.s. 144, 2001; but there is one important difference. At the end of Oedipus Rex we can discern a perfectly clear motive for the alternation, and that motive is to make the play end in a way that will be compatible with the presuppositions of the later Oedipus at Colonus, a necessary step if the two plays, with or without Antigone as a third, were ever to be staged together. For the doctrine of the end of Agamemnon one cannot so easily divine the motive, and I leave to the pleasing speculations of others how Anchylus really intended his play to end.

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There are a number of things which I find puzzling about the prologue to Eumenides, among them the enumeration of various deities after an apparently concluding formula in vv. 20 τομίων και ἐν Χώραις Ἀργομελίζων Θεοί καί which有助于 the place of honour which the first two names had assigned to Gaia (προεσφόρας / προεσφόροντ). The ημετέρα in v. 29 is wanted on the; I cannot think of any reason why the prophetess should ask the divinities to grant her a far better entrance than she has ever had before, and I am taken aback by the unique form ημετέρα in v. 32. My concerns have been felt by others before me, and if one consults Wedgwood’s Appendix one finds most notably Herrman, Hartung, and Weil proposing various locutions and transpositions. All I want to do at present, however, is to concentrate on vv. 24-26 as they stand, regardless of whether they are in the right place

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and whether or not they ought to have a locating market before or after their death. The old
cri of διός διός τοῦ Διός does not apply here, but rather its reverse: what is Dionysus doing in a stay in which the principal deities are Athene and Apollo from the upper world, and the Furies from the world below?

Professor Mairalis has given us the literary answer: as well as the enlightened, orderly world of Apollo, there is a darker world, from which the Furies come. Dionysus belongs to a less orderly world than Apollo, and he once led Bacchante who killed Pentheus just as the Furies would like to kill Orestes. This may very well be the what the author of the lines intended us to infer, though he has left us with a considerable gap for our imaginations to leap over. However, I concede at once that Professor Mairalis is right to see the problem, and I think if any one could have had a more perceptive vew provided we are sure that Aeschylus actually wrote the lines.

Let us, as we did with Agamemnon, put the lines under the microscope. I list possible objections:

1) εὖν Diogēnoς is ill-placed if it is intended to mean 'and I do not forget to mention Bromios in my list of divinities'. Where it stands it gives the force of 'Bromios is the god of the place, and I am not forgetful, even since I commanded the Bacchante'. Weir Smyth's translation 'Him I forget not' takes advantage of a useful ambiguity in the English language, whereby 'forget' can mean 'forget to mention'. The Bacchante 'sa me garde de l'oublier' is even more explicit, but I see nothing in the lexicon to encourage us to believe that αὐτός is a permissible use of διός.

2) Bromios as a synonym of Dionysus is not to be found elsewhere in Aeschylus or Sophocles, and in the only ante-Aeschylean occurrence, namely Phaed. fr. 75.10 τὸν κοῦτοναθ θεόν, τὸν Βρομίον, τὸν Ερμοθέαν το βορτι νολέομαι, the poet is still clearly using the word adjectively.

3) ἕτερος ἐστιν: θεός is peculiar in more ways than one. It can only mean 'the god commanded the Bacchante'. The use of 'the god', where the god is the same as Bromios just mentioned, is anomalous. 'A god indeed' is how Weir Smyth tries to cope with the anomaly, but there is no 'indeed' in the Greek. 'Sa divinité' is the Buda version, where the translator has again perceived the oddity of θεός, and copes with it by applying to the problem a mind accustomed to such periphrases of modern times as 'Her Majesty' when one means 'The Queen'. Then the verb itself needs scrutiny. It can only mean 'commanded'. It cannot mean what we would expect to see, 'marched against': Agis. Weir Smyth elegantly slides around the problem with 'chaused the Bacchic host', while the Buda courageously 'translates as 'conceived as combat'. We may note in passing that the verb is the same as the one which appears in line 1 of
Sophocles Electra, ὣ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐν Τρεῖς τοῦ, a line which most scholars now regard as spurious.

4) ἄγα τίτικ λέξει looks like a mistake of the δικαν = 'like' idiom. Everywhere else such employment of δικαν relates to the action of the person who is the subject of the verb, which would give us the nonsensical after devising, as a hero might devise it, death for Pentheus. There is only one conceivable exception to the rule, and that is Agam. 919-20, ἵνα βαθύρος ψυχός δικαν ἔχαστο πορεῶν ἔξω. The crucial point there is that the contemptuous language of v. 920 describes the behavior to be expected of a servile Oriental, not the behavior that might be adopted by a freeborn Greek towards an Oriental. Like the sentence which follows, it tells Clytemnestra what she should not be doing.

5) The nominative participle καταστραφάς is unexpected. One does not expect 'having plotted' but 'to bring about' i.e. a future participle, or at least a present, 'encompassing', to follow the 'commanded' verb.

6) v. 20 has no caesura. We know that this is not impossible, but interestingly it was the only objection actually mentioned by Paley when he expressed his faint suspicion of the line and his even fainter suspicion of the two lines preceding it. This verse, if not the two preceding, may possibly be an interpolation.

I would express myself rather more emphatically.