

**PSEUDO-AESCHYLUS: *AGAMEMNON* 1630-73;
EUMENIDES 24-26**

The present paper has been prompted by two contributions to the Trento 2000 conference which can be found printed in *Lexis* 19 (2001). One was by Dr. Medda, on the attribution of lines at *Agam.* 1649-54 and such notorious problems as that of the *λοχῖται* who are sprung on us so unexpectedly at v. 1650. The other was by Prof. Miralles, who considered a passage so much less notorious that its oddity has passed unobserved by almost every one, but is none the less real for all that, namely «What is Dionysus doing in the prologue to the third play of the *Oresteia*?». Each of these scholars has taken the entirely responsible attitude: «This is what the text says; it is difficult, and it needs explanation. Here then is the explanation I offer», and each of them has done all that could possibly be done to surmount the problems they confronted. What I offer now is a more drastic solution: to cure, at a single stroke, many of the ills in the two passages concerned, by suggesting that what we are looking at is not the work of Aeschylus at all, and so should not be judged by the ordinary canons of Aeschylean language and technique.

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Curious things happen at the end of *Agamemnon*. We know from Klytaimestra's own lips, and we see with our own eyes (1379 ff.), that it was she who dealt the fatal blows which killed the King. Now, at the end of the play, the chorus speak to Aigisthos, accusing him not of committing the murder, but of plotting it: the role of a woman (1625 ff.). So far, no problem: Klytaimestra has done the deed like a man, and Aigisthos has fulfilled the function of a woman. But now the roles are suddenly reversed. Is this simply for reasons of characterisation - to depict Aigisthos as a vainglorious coward? And do we then acquiesce in watching Klytaimestra stand by without saying a word by way of correction? Or is there another explanation?

Before we make up our minds, let us see what else catches us by surprise. We may start with 1631 f.: *ἔξορίνας* has no object. If *νηπίοις ὑλάγμασιν* were in the accusative case, we would have perfectly normal Greek. Metre rules out any such possibility. So Denniston-Page write «Sc. τὸν ἀκούοντα». That is quite a big *scilicet*. Schneidewin's idea that *πάντα* (1630) is the object is grammatically, but only grammatically, a much more plausible explanation. We may add two other points which we borrow from Fraenkel: 1. *ἔξορίνειν* is unique. 2. Even *ορίνειν* is unknown to tragedy.

An unfortunate beginning, but it gets worse, for immediately we face *ἄξει* in the sense, we are told, 'take into custody'. «As so often», says Fraenkel, citing *Sept.* 340, *ἄλλος δ' ἄλλον ἄγει, φονεύει, τὰ δὲ πυρφορεῖ*. The model is Hom. I 594, as Prof. Zimmermann's paper (pp. 191 ss.) reminds us. Were it not for that model we

might be quite perplexed, since so far as tragedy is concerned, or even Pindar for that matter, we have no parallels. Herodotus often uses ἄγω of people being led off into captivity, as in the Homer passage, but always in a context which makes the meaning plain (*ex. gr.* 3. 21. 2 ἐς δουλοσύνην ἀνθρώπους ἦγε), and often accompanied by words like λαβών, ξυλλαβών, ζωγρήσαντες... ἀφέλκοντες (6. 91. 2). The aged chorus are hardly the prizes of war. Even if they were, the way this passage is laid out is extremely peculiar. Let us pretend we have a fragment. It begins «Your voice is the opposite of Orpheus's, for *he* used to ἄγω everything by his delightful voice, but *you* with your silly yapping...» then what? We expect something like, in a more poetic form, «just alienate people», and ἐξορίνας seems to confirm that expectation. But then what we get is «will be ἄγω». It seems as though some contrast is intended between Orpheus as a sort of precursor of the pied piper of Hamelin, and the chorus as twelve of the rats. But the contrast simply does not work, even though by using ἡμερώτερος the poet has still got the idea of animals being tamed in his mind - as if the chorus had up to now been behaving as savage beasts who need to be κρατῶ. Lastly, within this confused passage we have the strange phraseology of ἀπὸ φθογγῆς χαρᾶ. It is not surprising that scholars in the past, taking the words as genuine Aeschylus, have found them hard to swallow. But if they are not by Aeschylus... ?

In 1634 f. we will accept without enthusiasm the double negative, and contain our surprise that the obvious correction to τό γ' ἔργον was apparently not made before Lobel. But consider the logic. Aigisthos threatens the chorus with disciplinary action. The chorus sneer «As if you are going to be the tyrant over the Argives». Well, who else is going to be? Sarcasm is doubtless intended, but it fails because Aigisthos certainly will be the tyrant. Aigisthos's response to the jibe is also peculiar. He has been accused of plotting Agamemnon's murder, but of lacking the nerve to execute it. This corresponds with the facts of the play as we have seen it develop. So what reply should Aigisthos make to this taunt? That is not an easy question to answer, but the reply which he does make is a complete *non sequitur*. «Trickery was clearly a woman's role; as for me, I was a suspect enemy from long ago». Fraenkel does not face the difficulty. Denniston-Page do, and explain that δολῶσαι «does not, as the word itself would suggest, refer to the *planning*, but to the fact that the *deed* involved the use of trickery».

That comes close to saying that δολῶσαι does not mean δολῶσαι. In what way was trickery involved in the deed as opposed to the planning? The deed involved primarily the use of an axe. True, at *Cho.* 1003 the other item, the net, is called a δόλωμα, but only after it has been called a number of other things. Nor is our sentence improved by σαφῶς as its last word. If this line had been deficient in its final two syllables, and suggestions for filling the gap been invited, any modern critic

who suggested <σᾰφῶς> would be greeted only by embarrassed smiles. The word is tagged on at the end, and is doubly unfortunate in a context where secret, covert planning is the subject.

The gap in thought between 1637 and 1638, between feminine wiles and male reluctance to act on the one hand, and the utilisation of Agamemnon's wealth as a basis for wielding political power on the other, well merits Hermann's comment: «nimis abrupta opum Agamemnonis mentio». Fraenkel swallows Klausen's defence that as tyrant Aigisthos's prime need was for money for his minions. So it may have been, if we consider the matter as one of *Realpolitik* in ancient Argos following an assassination. But our concern is not with what the political situation might have been in the real world, but with the language actually used in the passage before us, which leaves unsaid the things that would need to be said if there is to be a smooth and natural transition from feminine plotter/executioner + suspect male enemy of the royal house to the latter's exploitation of seized financial assets. The disjunction of themes is made all the more noticeable by the «great rarity» (Denniston-Page) of the word order ἐκ τῶν δὲ τοῦδε χρημάτων for ἐκ δὲ τῶν..., and by the abnormal use of οὐ μὴ with an epithet, not a verb. Not that we should lay too much stress on that second objection, for μὴ as a possible corruption of μὴν belongs to the category of the routine, and routine corruption is not proof that the passage in which it is embedded is not authentic.

It is significant that the chorus take no notice of the threat which has just been directed at them, and at 1643 f. revert to the male/female aspects of the murder. «Why didn't you kill this man here yourself» or «by yourself»? In itself this might be used as an argument that if 1643-48 prove that 1638-42 are spurious, then 1643-48 must itself be authentic. However, we may have to reckon with not one interpolator, but more than one, just as we do at the end of *Oedipus Rex*. Alternatively we may simply say that the quality of the interpolated passage is poor and ill thought out. I prefer the latter explanation because, unlike the end of *Oedipus Rex*, the style is uniform throughout - uniformly bad, that is. We will find that verdict justified if we look at the detail of what is said.

We start with 1643. «Why did you not kill this man yourself *in the cowardice of your heart?*» (So Fraenkel). But «the cowardice of your heart» answers the very question put. You could legitimately say 'You *shrank from* killing him in the cowardice of your heart', but if you are going to formulate a question with this ἀπο idiom, you should be writing not ἀπὸ ψυχῆς κακῆς but something like ἀπ' εὐτόλμου φρενός as in 1302: why did you not have *the courage* to kill him yourself?

Then in 1644 we are bound to have misgivings over Denniston-Page's defence of ἀλλὰ σὺν γυνή. «Aegisthus has claimed full credit for the deed». But he hasn't. At

1604 he called himself only the ῥαφεύς, and explicitly said that he was θυραῖος, absent, from the actual commission of the deed. It is the chorus who say at 1613 ἐκὼν κατακτανεῖν, but then instantly modify their words to «alone plotted this murder». Comparison with other adverbial occurrences of σύν listed in *LSJ* s.v. c) shows just how odd the present example is: the nuance is always «and ... as well», never «but together with». Spanheim gave us what logic requires, νιν for σύν, and Page cites this in the sparse apparatus of the Oxford text. West does not include it in his own edition, doubtless feeling the force of Denniston-Page's perfectly justified comment that the change is «in itself unlikely». This kind of *impasse*, where the text can just about be swallowed, but only with much misgiving and by a massive effort of will, meets us many times in the closing scenes of *Agamemnon*, and leaves us with the feeling that it is incompetence, rather than corruption, that is staring us in the face.

An *impasse* of a different kind, where there is no fault in logic, and *may* be none in linguistic usage, immediately follows. How are we to construe v. 1645, χώρας μίαισμα καὶ θεῶν ἐγχωρίων? The *impasse* this time takes the form of forcing us to choose between elegant style and normal grammar. If v. 1645 is in straight apposition to γυνή, all runs smoothly. There is no difficulty in having a person described as a μίαισμα: cf. Soph. *OT* 97, 241. But it does mean that the description is given in hindsight, for it is too vigorous to be a mere condemnation of Klytaimestra's previous adulterous conduct. She is only a μίαισμα after she has done the murder. So although linguistically unproblematic, in sense this interpretation is inferior to the one preferred by Fraenkel, taking v. 1645 as being in apposition to the whole sentence; which boils down to saying that the act ἔκτεινε is what constitutes the μίαισμα χώρας. Stylistically this is the more elegant way of taking the sentence. The snag is, as Fraenkel himself sees, having the appositional phrase 1645 in front of the verb to which it stands in apposition is highly abnormal.

That was a problem which the scholarly mind may solve by spinning a coin. The same cannot be said of 1646-48. We begin with ἄρα. This either introduces a question (Fraenkel) or a statement (Denniston-Page). In support of the latter we are referred to *Cho.* 435, ἀτίμωσιν ἄρα τείσει. But there ἄρα meets Denniston's criterion (*Greek Particles*, 45) of «marking realization of the truth, or drawing a conclusion». There, in *Cho.* 435, we have «The whole tale you have told is one of dishonour; well then, she shall pay for that dishonouring». There is no such inferential tone here in *Agamemnon*. ἄρα must introduce a question, as West prints it. For the question to work I would take σου as 'perhaps' not as 'somewhere', notwithstanding the suitability of 'somewhere' as a precursor to δεῦρο. «Is Orestes perhaps alive ... » is a question to unsettle the would-be tyrant. However, all that is by the way, and does not impinge on the question of authenticity.

What does impinge is the clause ὅπως... γένηται in 1647 f., on which there is no note in the current editions. There should be, for it is a *final* clause, whereas what we need is a consecutive clause. «Does Orestes perhaps enjoy the light of the sun (=is he still alive) *in order* that he may with luck come back and kill this pair?» is inept. «Is Orestes perhaps alive, *and so* may come back and kill this pair?» is much more the sense required. The author must have meant to say this, but he has not in fact said it.

In 1648 we must look askance at the third person «this pair here» for the more obvious second person «the pair of you». Commentators do the only thing possible, and allege that the words are not spoken directly to Aigisthos, but are an aside to be heard only by the audience. Well, which words? From 'Orestes' (1646) onwards, says Fraenkel. But can we think of any place in Greek tragedy where the first two syllables of an iambic line are addressed to some particular person, and the rest to an audience (or to themselves, which amounts to the same thing), while the previous addressee is struck by a sudden and convenient deafness? The lines are in any case much more effective as a threat than as abstract musing, and it is indeed as a threat that Aigisthos, not deaf after all, it appears, seems to take them in 1649, ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ δοκεῖς τὰδ' ἔρδειν καὶ λέγειν, γνώση τάχα.

But with 1649 we move into even murkier waters. First there is τὰδ' ἔρδειν, 'to do this'. To do what? The chorus are doing nothing. Then γνώση τάχα. What is the object of γνώση? It does not need one, say the commentators, and we are referred to Eur. *Her.* 65, *Suppl.* 580, and Theocritus 22. 63 and 26.19. The first runs: «You won't take me or these people away by force». γνώση σύ – «you are evidently not much of a prophet». The second: «What kind of a warrior can come from a dragon?» Answer: «You 'll find out the hard way» - γνώση σὺ πάσχων. In both cases what is to be supplied with γνώση is immediately obvious from the context. The Theocritus examples are no different. Now there may be a lacuna in our texts at 1658 f., as West supposes, and if we wanted to make 1649 f. conform to what we apprehend to be good style and grammar, we could easily imagine one here too, as some scholars have done in the past (Fraenkel, 780 n. 3). The omission of a line beginning with εἰ, preceding two other lines beginning with εἶα, is certainly a possibility. But on the face of it we must add γνώση to our list of things which are not totally unintelligible, but which fail to speak to us in impeccable Greek.

In 1650 εἶα δῆ is unique (except for its immediate repetition) in tragedy. It is with such slips that interpolators give themselves away; compare the injudicious δηλαδῆ at *OT* 1501. In the same line the question of who the λοχῖται may be is one to which Dr. Medda has addressed himself. He has rightly expressed dissatisfaction with every theory so far advanced on who these worthies may be, and urges us to believe that they are an hitherto invisible force on whom Aigisthos may call. Doubtless in real life such a man would have his own bodyguard, but even in *Choephoroe* and

Sophocles *Electra* (v. 36) they are only a notional body of men, not actual persons on stage. And one must wonder why Aigisthos, of all people, should address his followers in so genial a fashion as to call them φίλοι. To be set against these we have the equally hitherto invisible force of honest burghers on whom the chorus can call at this moment of crisis, persons who are comprehensively addressed as πᾶς τις. It is a pity that they were unavailable at the time of the king's murder when the chorus ineffectually wring their hands at 1346-71. The question of who the λοχῖται and who the πᾶς τις people may be is bound up with the attribution of lines; and on that topic I have nothing to contribute beyond an expression of surprise that it has apparently not yet been suggested (but surely it must have been, by some one, somewhere) that 1650 and 1651 are alternative versions of the same line, like those that we find several times, particularly in the early part, in Sophocles *Trachiniae*.

Springing two shadowy bands of men on us at the very end of the play is as implausible as the old idea that the old men of the chorus suddenly start waving swords about. As Dr. Medda has pointed out, they were on their own admission physically pretty feeble ten years before. Implausible, that is, if we continue with the tacit assumption that these are lines written by Aeschylus. Tragic convention seems to be flouted. But is there anything in the actual words which points to non-Aeschylean authorship? Dr. Medda has acutely observed something odd in 1651: πᾶς τις is never found with imperatives or hortatory utterances. It belongs rather to γνῶμαι. From the whole of Greek tragedy Dr. Medda has only been able to find three contrary instances. One is from a spurious play (*Rhesus* 687); another is from a play which is very heavily interpolated, and from a section labelled by Dr. Diggle as certainly not by Euripides (*IA* 1598 f.); and the third, in a modified form, πᾶς ὅστις at Soph. *Ai.* 1413 f., comes in a part of the play which for a multiplicity of reasons has been condemned as spurious, and is printed as such in the Teubner edition. If you believe that a line is to be judged by the company it keeps, you will not struggle to retain 1651 as the work of Aeschylus.

πρόκωπος (1652) is doubtless corrupt, but in any case has no bearing on the question of authenticity. The next line, however, seems once again to face us with the problem that the sense intended is clear enough, even if we do not know for sure who is speaking to whom; the scope for emendation is very limited; but the line fails to match up to our expectations of Aeschylean Greek. At the end of a long note Fraenkel says that the literal sense cannot be other than «You say you have been killed». Denniston-Page agree, resorting to the ignominious solution of writing γε for σε: «We accept the omen when you say θανεῖν». (That proposal was made by a pair of unlikely bedfellows, Edgar Lobel and Archibald Campbell). Blaydes had a solution worth considering: θανεῖσθαι meets the objection of tense, eliminates the unwelcome σε, and presupposes the phonetic confusion of αι and ε, just as in Dorat's

αἰρούμεθα for ἐρούμεθα in the same line. Though Dorat must be right, where does his correction actually get us? τὴν τύχην δ' αἰρούμεθα is justly called «this obscure phrase» by Denniston-Page, who in essence, if not in fact, translate as «we choose this hazard» (sc. of any sword-play to come), though the sense we probably expected to find was a restatement of the first half of the line, something like «We seize upon this omen which a happy chance has offered us». Unfortunately Fraenkel's appeal to v. 685 is of no real help - γλῶσσαν ἐν τύχῃ νέμων - because there the thought that Helen is the right name for her, and the one who gave her that name hit the mark, is plainly not far from the surface. None the less one may suspect that the sense which we have said we probably expected to find was indeed the sense which the interpolator thought he had expressed.

We may make the same diagnosis of a mismatch between intention and execution in 1655. Many have itched to detach πολλά from ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰδ' ἐξαμῆσαι and to link it instead with δύστηνον θέρος, as if it were much like σφόδρα. But such a use is unknown. However, the alternative, «Even these are many to reap, a harvest of misfortune» (Fraenkel), involves a predicative use of πολλά which is equally unparalleled, and seems especially objectionable coming as the last word in its phrase. Predicates like to come early.

Now 1656. Denniston's words (*Greek Particles*, 155) are that δέ... γε is «weakly adversative, or purely continuative. There are a few apparent examples in tragedy, almost all of them suspicious». (We are ignoring, for obvious reasons, the other section on the use of δέ... γε as strongly adversative) . Suspicious indeed, for example, is Soph. *Ai.* 1409, which is found in the same section, teeming with anomalies, as the πᾶς ὅστις discussed above. *Electra* 548 looks sound: φαίη δ' ἄν ἢ θανοῦσά γ', εἰ φωνήν λάβοι. But when Denniston translates as «Aye, and the dead maid would say so» he is needlessly trying to account for a δέ... γε which is more apparent than real. The γε there stands on its own merits: It is not just I who say this: *the dead girl* would too, if she could talk. Not adversative, and not continuative, but just an ordinary δέ with a γε underlining the one word θανοῦσα.

As for μηδὲν αἵματώμεθα, Dorat's change to μηκέθ' is a real help for those who wish to restore some sanity to the proceedings. Fraenkel rejects it because it involves Klytimestra making a direct reference to the murder of Agamemnon. But any one hearing Klytimestra say «Let us not have any bloodshed» might instantly and reasonably retort: «Klytimestra dear, there are two dead bodies in the house, and you are responsible for both of them. Do you not think you have left it a little late?» Defenders of Aeschylean authorship should accept this emendation, and because it is so easily made we cannot fairly insist on keeping μηδὲν and then using the word as further proof of sub-standard writing.

1657 αἰδοῖοι γέροντες, the respectable old men, is an emendation «so neat palaeographically that we may be tempted to overlook its deficiency in sense: it is in the highest degree improbable that Clytaemnestra should address her enemies by this exceptionally respectful term» (Denniston-Page). That deficiency in sense is not the only one in this line. There are the «fated homes», the δόμους πεπρωμένους. One has every sympathy with West's desire to follow Madvig in giving us πεπρωμένους / πρὶν παθεῖν εἴξαντες, but there is no evidence that the plural perfect participle passive is ever so used. We know of ἡ πεπρωμένη and τὸ πεπρωμένον and 'fated wars', but πεπρωμένα as equivalent to ἀνάγκη is something else again.

As we move ever closer to the end of the play we find the text becoming more and more corrupt, and that in turn deprives us of even *prima facie* evidence for determining authenticity or its reverse. But there are still two other places which meet our criterion of being a) not obviously corrupt, and b) unsatisfactory. The first is 1668 f. The author of these lines has failed to bring out the contrast - if indeed he intended one - between ἐλπίδας σιτουμένους and πιαίνου. Αὐτὸ δέ or equivalent would have been welcome in 1669, and at the start of that line πρᾶσσε, which seems an unduly vigorous precursor to 'grow fat', is not all that well defended by the citation of four passages from Greek literature, one of which has ἔρδω, two others δράω, and the fourth is not a parallel anyway because there πρᾶσσε has an object.

We may pass over 1670 ἄποινα τῆσδε μωρίας χάριν, for it can hardly be called offensive, though it remains true that normal usage would have dispensed with the χάριν - and indeed some editors do eliminate it in favour of a replacement; and come instead to 1672. προτιμῶ should take the accusative, as it does at *Eum.* 640, 739. Fraenkel tries to refute this by saying that a negatived προτιμῶ with the genitive is a peculiarly Attic construction. What he means is that Aristophanes *Plut.* 993 and Eur. *Alc.* 761 have οὐδὲν προτιμᾶν with a genitive, where the οὐδὲν plainly makes a difference. The further citation of Thucyd. 8.64.5 is unconvincing, since if the sparse apparatus to the Oxford text is to be trusted, all manuscripts but one do in fact there offer the accusative.

Let us summarise the position. No one can deny that the end of *Agamemnon* suffers from serious corruption. But it also suffers from something else: a plethora of expressions which are not demonstrably corrupt, which offer translatable Greek of a kind, but which in some cases offend against normal Aeschylean practice, and which time after time leave us with a feeling of disappointment amounting to incredulity. On p. 789 in volume III of his commentary, Fraenkel has a footnote which quotes the following from Arthur Platt on v. 1653: «It does not altogether please me, but I see nothing better to be done. Had I been writing the line myself I would have said δεχομένοις θανεῖν ἔλεξας». Fraenkel comments: «This confession suggests wonderful possibilities of a verse-composition match of English schools against

Aeschylus of Athens, and is at the same time so delightful in its self-mockery that I cannot forbear to quote it». The ponderous Fraenkel is anxious not to be accused of a lack of humour. But in a way Platt has put his finger on what is characteristic of the shortcomings of the end of *Agamemnon*. If the portion of the play which we have been reviewing were submitted as an entry for the Porson prize at Cambridge University, kindly examiners might take the candidate to one side and tactfully explain why they were unable even to award him an honourable mention.

If we ask ourselves whether we can think of anywhere else in the texts of Greek tragedy where we are assailed by misgivings of an exactly similar kind, the answer is yes, we can. The end of *Oedipus Rex* is the culprit, which like the end of *Agamemnon* begins to go off the rails in its iambs, but only reaches the full flower of its incompetence in its trochaic tetrameters. Fraenkel in his note on 1649 ff. had observed: «In all that remains to us of Greek drama the only parallel to be found - and it is a very close one - is in the final scene of the *Oedipus Rex*». When Fraenkel wrote those words, questions of authenticity were not in his mind. But in view of what he has said, if the end of *Oedipus Rex* is spurious, it must cast a shadow over the end of *Agamemnon* also. That the end of the Sophoclean play really is spurious is something long suspected, and I believe myself to have contributed to the proof of this in the article I published in *RhM* n.f. 144, 2001. But there is one important difference. At the end of *Oedipus Rex* we can discern a perfectly clear motive for the alterations, and that motive is to make the play end in a way that will be compatible with the presuppositions of the later *Oedipus at Colonus*, a necessary step if the two plays, with or without *Antigone* as a third, were ever to be staged together. For the doctoring of the end of *Agamemnon* one cannot so easily divine the motive, and I leave to the pleasing speculations of others how Aeschylus really intended his play to end.

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There are a number of things which I find puzzling about the prologue to *Eumenides*, among them the enumeration of various deities after an apparently concluding formula in v. 20 τούτους ἐν εὐχαῖς φροιμιάζομαι θεούς after which Pallas is assigned the place of honour which the first two lines had assigned to Gaia (πρεσβεύω / πρεσβεύεται); the ἔπειτα in v. 29 is wasted on me; I cannot think of any reason why the prophetess should ask the divinities to grant her a *far better* entrance than she has ever had before; and I am taken aback by the unique form ἴτων in v. 32. My concerns have been felt by others before me, and if one consults Wecklein's *Appendix* one finds most notably Hermann, Hartung, and Weil proposing various lacunae and transpositions. All I want to do at present, however, is to concentrate on vv. 24-26 as they stand, regardless of whether they are in the right place

and whether or not they ought to have a lacuna marked before or after them. The old cry of οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον does not apply here, but rather its reverse: what is Dionysus doing in a play in which the principal deities are Athena and Apollo from the upper world, and the Furies from the world below?

Professor Miralles has given us the literary answer: as well as the enlightened, orderly world of Apollo, there is a darker world, from which the Furies come. Dionysus belongs to a less orderly world than Apollo, and he once led Bacchants who killed Pentheus just as the Furies would like to kill Orestes. This may very well be what the author of the lines intended us to infer, though he has left us with a considerable gulf for our imaginations to leap over. However, I concede at once that Professor Miralles is right to see the problem, and I doubt if any one could have given a more perceptive answer *provided we are sure that Aeschylus actually wrote the lines*.

Let us, as we did with Agamemnon, put the lines under the microscope. I list possible objections:

1) οὐδ' ἀμνημονῶ is ill-placed if it is intended to mean «and I do not forget to mention Bromios in my list of divinities». Where it stands it gives the force of «Bromios is the god of the place, and I am not forgetful, ever since he commanded the Bacchants». Weir Smyth's translation «Him I forget not» takes advantage of a useful ambiguity in the English language, whereby 'forget' can mean 'forget to mention'. The Budé translation «Je me garde de l'oublier» is even more explicit, but I see nothing in the lexicon to encourage us to believe that this is a permissible use of ἀμνημονῶ.

2) Bromios as a synonym of Dionysus is not to be found elsewhere in Aeschylus or Sophocles, and in the only ante-Aeschylus occurrence, namely Pindar fr. 75.10 τὸν κισσοδαῆ θεόν, τὸν βρόμιον, τὸν Ἐριβόαν τε βροτοὶ καλέομεν, the poet is still clearly using the word adjectivally.

3) ἐστρατήγησεν θεός is peculiar in more ways than one. It can only mean «the god commanded the Bacchants». The use of 'the god', where the god is the same as Bromios just mentioned, is anomalous. 'A god indeed' is how Weir Smyth tries to cope with the anomaly, but there is no 'indeed' in the Greek. «Sa divinité» is the Budé version, where the translator has again perceived the oddity of θεός, and copes with it by applying to the problem a mind accustomed to such periphrases of modern times as 'Her Majesty' when one means 'The Queen'. Then the verb itself needs scrutiny. It can only mean 'commanded'. It cannot mean what we would expect to see, 'marched against'. Again Weir Smyth elegantly slides around the problem with «headed the Bacchic host», while the Budé courageously mistranslates as «conduisait au combat». We may note in passing that the verb is the same as the one which appears in line 1 of

Sophocles *Electra*, ὧ τοῦ στρατηγήσαντος ἐν Τροίᾳ ποτέ, a line which most scholars now regard as spurious.

4) λαγῶ δίκην looks like a misuse of the δίκην = 'like' idiom. Everywhere else such employment of δίκην relates to the action of the person who is the subject of the verb, which would give us the nonsensical «after devising, as a hare might devise it, death for Pentheus». There is only one conceivable exception to the rule, and that is *Agam.* 919-20, μηδὲ βαρβάρου φωτὸς δίκην / χαμαιπετὲς βόαμα προσχάνης ἐμοί. The crucial point there is that the contemptuous language of v. 920 describes the behaviour to be expected of a servile Oriental, not the behaviour that might be adopted by a freeborn Greek *towards* an Oriental. Like the sentence which follows, it tells Clytaimestra what she should not be doing.

5) The aorist participle καταρράψας is unexpected. One does not expect 'having plotted' but 'to bring about' i.e. a future participle, or at least a present, 'encompassing', to follow the 'commanded' verb.

6) v. 26 has no caesura. We know that this is not impossible, but interestingly it was the only objection actually mentioned by Paley when he expressed his faint suspicion of the line and his even fainter suspicion of the two lines preceding it. «This verse, if not the two preceding, may possibly be an interpolation».

I would express myself rather more emphatically.

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